Suggestions for new topics?

If any lawyers or non-lawyers out there have suggestions for any legal topics you’d like to explore, please feel free to email with any suggestions or questions.  I have a few new topics planned that I’m working on, but always open to others.

Depositions: Statutes, Cases, Rules & Tips

Accessible by clicking below is a PDF version of a two-page summary of important deposition law.  Included are statutes, cases, and applicable rules covering objections, permissible areas of questioning, interpreter qualifications, who may attend a deposition, harassing questions, etc.  This is a useful document to print-out and use if you are an attorney and either taking or defending a deposition, as the specific legal cites for the various points are all listed.

Here is a small excerpt:

IMPROPER CONDUCT BY DEPONENT’S COUNSEL
• Coaching: Coaching the deponent is potentially sanctionable as a discovery abuse under CCP § 2023.010, Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services, 186 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1562 (2010). Unilaterally going off the record is not allowed. CCP § 2025.470.

• Making Improper Objections: “Making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery” is a sanctionable misuse of the discovery process. CCP § 2023.010(e).

• Instructing Witness Not to Answer: Normally improper for counsel to instruct witness not to answer a question. Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc., 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015 (2001). Defects in the form of the question are not grounds for instruction not to answer. Id., at 1014. Deposing counsel may suspend or complete deposition and later seek order compelling

answer. CCP § 2025.460(d) Exception: May instruct deponent not to answer, suspend deposition and move for protective if examination “being conducted in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses that deponent or party.” CCP §§ 2025.470; 2025.420(b).

*** CLICK PDF LINK BELOW – “Deposition Law Overview 2015” – for a 2-page reference guide. ***

Deposition Objections Overview 2015 revision

The 75-Day Notice Requirement Is Mandatory for Motions for Summary Judgment Or Motions for Summary Adjudication

Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(a) requires a minimum of 75 calendar days notice and does not set forth any exceptions. Moreover, Section 437c(b)(6) provides: “Except for subdivision (c) of Section 1005 relating to the method of service of opposition and reply papers, Sections 1005 and 1013, extending the time within which a right may be exercised or an act may be done, do not apply to this section.” ”[T]he statutory language regarding minimum notice is mandatory, not directive.” Urshan v. Musicians’ Credit Union, 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 764 (2004). Neither an order of court, nor a local court rule, may impose procedural requirements, including time deadlines, which conflict with the procedures set out in Section 437c. First State Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.App.4th 324, 330-331 (2000), and authorities cited therein; see also Boyle v. Certain Teed Corp.,137 Cal.App.4th 645 (2006).

Last year, the Court of Appeal re-emphasized this clear-cut requirement that the 75 day notice period is a minimum notice period and is indeed mandatory:

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (a) provides that a party moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “shall” serve notice of the motion and supporting papers “on all other parties to the action at least 75 days before the time appointed for hearing.” (Ibid., italics added.) This language is mandatory and the court has no discretion to shorten the time.

Cuff v. Grossmont Union High School District, 221 Cal.App.4th 582, 595-596 (Nov. 18, 2013).

The Cuff case also confirms that a trial court has no authority to shorten the time for the 75-day notice of a summary judgment hearing unless all the parties agree. McMahon v. Superior Court, 106 Cal.App.4th 112 (2003); accord, UAS Management, Inc. v. Mater Misericordiae Hospital, 169 Cal.App.4th 357 (2008); Urshan v. Musicians’ Credit Union, 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 764 (2004). Nor can a trial court continue the hearing on the motion in order to achieve the required 75-day notice. Robinson v. Woods, 168 Cal.App.4th 1258 (2008).

So, for example, if a party serves a motion for summary judgment with only 72 days (rather than 75 days) notice, a court is not allowed to grant them relief from that mistake.  Rather, the party would have to re-file and re-serve the motion for summary judgment, allowing for 75 days service.  Of course, under Section 437c, the motion must still be heard at least 30 days before trial, unless the moving party can establish good cause for why the hearing date would be within 30 days of trial.

If you are a party that needs to oppose a motion for summary judgment or motion for summary adjudication, and the other party served the motion less than 75 days ahead of the hearing date, you should make an ex parte application citing the above legal authorities.  That ex parte application should request that the motion be denied and/or taken off calendar because it was improperly noticed.  This will avoid you having to do a full-blown substantive opposition to the motion.  Moreover, some authorities hold that if you appear at a hearing you waive any defects of notice.  So, it is better to be proactive and do an initial and early  opposition of the motion on notice grounds rather than waiting until the 14 days before the hearing date to file an opposition claiming you were not given the mandatory 75 days notice.

Motion to Compel Discovery: Verified Responses Required to Start the 45 Day Deadline Countdown

Without much fanfare, an important amendment was recently made to the Discovery Act.  In the past, the deadline for filing a notice of motion for a motion to compel further discovery was always 45 days after service of the discovery responses.  However, the Discovery Act had been unclear as to whether the 45 day time period started when verified responses were served, or when merely unverified responses were served.  Under Appleton v. Superior Court, 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636 (1988), unverified responses were considered the equivalent of no responses at all, so the state of the law was unclear as to when the 45 day countdown began because it was unclear if the 45 day countdown started only once a verification was received.

Now, it is confirmed that the 45 day deadline does not start counting down until verified responses are served.  Senate Bill AB 1183 amended Code of Civil Procedure Sections 2030.300(c), 2031.310(c), and 2033.290(c) to reflect that motions to compel further responses from interrogatories, inspection demands, or requests for admissions do not need to be filed until 45 days after verified responses are served.

Link to codes: http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=ccp&group=02001-03000&file=2030.210-2030.310

Some, But Not All, Depositions in California Limited to Seven Hours

At the beginning of this year, Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.290 went into effect.  Section 2025.290 limits depositions, with several exceptions, to a time limit of 7 hours, which is somewhat similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d).  This article is just a basic overview of the new rule on deposition time limits in California.

Again, the general thrust of Section 2025.290 is that depositions are limited to seven hours of time.  However, there are numerous exceptions to this rule.  A court may issue an order, including a case management conference order, setting forth that the seven hour limit does not apply.  If the deposition involves an expert witness, a “person most qualified,” or an employment case, the seven hour limit does not apply.  If a party appears in the action after a deposition has already occurred, the new party may take another deposition of a an already-deposed individual but the new deposition must be within the seven hour time limit. A complex case under CRC 3.400 is not limited to seven hours unless the survival of the deponent is in question.  Of course, in any case, the court may allow additional time beyond the 7 hours and the parties may stipulate to a waiver of the time limit.

Unlike the federal rules, there is still no requirement in California that the deposition has to be completed in one day.

It is likely that lawyers will try to frame their litigation as relating to “acts or omissions arising out of or relating to the employment relationship” in order to circumvent the seven hour time limit.

The full text of Section 2025.290 is as follows:

Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.290.

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), or by any court order, including a case management order, a deposition examination of the witness by all counsel, other than the witness’ counsel of record, shall be limited to seven hours of total testimony. The court shall allow additional time, beyond any limits imposed by this section, if needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, another person, or any other circumstance impedes or
delays the examination.
(b) This section shall not apply under any of the following circumstances:
(1) If the parties have stipulated that this section will not apply to a specific deposition or to the entire proceeding.
(2) To any deposition of a witness designated as an expert pursuant to Sections 2034.210 to 2034.310, inclusive.
(3) To any case designated as complex by the court pursuant to Rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court, unless a licensed physician attests in a declaration served on the parties that the deponent suffers from an illness or condition that raises substantial medical doubt of survival of the deponent beyond six months, in which case the deposition examination of the witness by all counsel, other than the witness’ counsel of record, shall be limited to two days of no more than seven hours of total testimony each day, or 14 hours of total testimony.
(4) To any case brought by an employee or applicant for employment against an employer for acts or omissions arising out of or relating to the employment relationship.
(5) To any deposition of a person who is designated as the most qualified person to be deposed under Section 2025.230.
(6) To any party who appeared in the action after the deposition has concluded, in which case the new party may notice another deposition subject to the requirements of this section.
(c) It is the intent of the Legislature that any exclusions made by this section shall not be construed to create any presumption or any substantive change to existing law relating to the appropriate time limit for depositions falling within the exclusion. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the existing right of any party to move for a protective order or the court’s discretion to make any order that justice requires to limit a deposition in order to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, or expense.

Demonstrations and Nonverbal Responses in a Deposition?

Some attorneys are under the misconception that in a deposition a deponent only has to answer questions and does not have to comply with any requests for physical demonstrations.  That was the law under Stermer v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 4th 777 (1993).  However, the California Supreme Court decision Emerson Electric Co. overruled that holding.  Emerson Electric Co. v. Sup. Ct. (Grayson), 16 Cal.4^th 1101 (1997).  In Emerson Electric Co., the plaintiff was injured while using the defendant’s radial saw.  During a videotaped deposition, the plaintiff deponent was asked to reenact how the injury occurred, and his attorney refused to allow him to do so.  The California Supreme Court established that a court’s power to order a deponent “to answer any question” (CCP § 2025.480(a)) includes the power to order nonverbal responses.  Emerson Elec. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (Grayson), 16 Cal.4^th 1101, 1111-1112 (1997).  So, a deponent may be asked to draw a diagram, demonstrate how he used the defective product, reenact the event in question, or possibly even furnish a handwriting sample.  Id., at 1111-1112.  A refusal to do so, and a subsequent refusal to obey a court order to do so, may subject the deponent to sanctions including evidence preclusion and terminating sanctions.  Id., at 1112.

Material Facts in a Motion for Summary Judgment

What is a “material fact” for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication?  Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(c) sets forth that a motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  However, a material fact is not actually defined in the Code of Civil Procedure.  Case law is not especially helpful either.  One decision established that a material fact must relate to a claim or defense at issue and “be essential to the judgment in some way.” Riverside Community Facilities Dist. v. Bainbridge 17, 77 Cal.App.4th 644, 653 (1999).  Not an especially helpful definition.

The lack of a clear understanding of what a material fact is can be troublesome because a trial court has no discretion to do anything other than deny a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication if a material fact is disputed.  Zavala v. Arce, 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925, fn 8 (1997); Saldana v. Globe-Weis Systems Co., 233 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1511-1512 (1991).  A moving party concedes a fact is a “material fact” by putting it in Separate Statement, so if it is successfully disputed, the opposing party should prevail on that cause of action or issue. Nazir v. United Airlines, 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 (2009).  The lesson here is that the tactic of setting forth dozens of material facts in a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may be ill-advised because if even one of them is successfully disputed, the motion may be denied.

Although it may be unclear as to what a material fact actually is, one should understand what a material fact is not.  Percipient facts and evidence of facts are not material facts.  For example, “Plaintiff testified that . . .” is not a material fact.  Reeves v. Safeway, 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 106 (2004). Similarly, “Plaintiff heard . . .” is a perception, not a material fact.  (Id.)  The Court of Appeal articulated these distinctions in the Reeves case, set forth in pertinent part:

At the threshold we observe that defendant has made our task–and that of the trial court–considerably more burdensome by its failure to comply with the requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1), that the moving party set forth “plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed.” (Italics added.) Instead of stating clearly those material facts which actually are without substantial controversy, defendant offers a number of obliquely stated “facts” that are material only to the extent they are controverted, and uncontroverted only to the extent they are immaterial. For instance, defendant asserts various “undisputed facts” in terms not of relevant events but of what a witness has said about events, e.g., two Safeway employees “stated that Plaintiff followed them out of the store, telling them that he had moved Sandy Juarez out of the way by lightly/gently pushing her aside.” It seems indisputably true that Brian Sparks so testified in deposition, though there is no competent evidence of such a report by the other worker, Barbara Flagen-Spicher. (See fn. 9, post.) But what Sparks (or for that matter Flagen-Spicher) might have said in deposition is not, as such, a “material fact.” It is of interest only as evidence of a material fact, e.g., that plaintiff made a damaging admission about his confrontation with Juarez. That “fact” is squarely controverted by plaintiff’s declaration that he made no such statement. We emphatically condemn Safeway’s attempt to circumvent that conflict by stating the supposed “fact” in an attributive form.

This stratagem takes an arguably even worse turn in Safeway’s assertion of “facts” in the form of supposed perceptions by witnesses. Thus it is said to be undisputed that “Brian Sparks overheard” something, and that “Sandy Juarez and Staci Siaris both witnessed” something. Ordinarily, however, the perceptions of witnesses are simply not “material facts,” as that term is used in the summary judgment statute. The relevant question is whether the underlying facts–the events or conditions witnesses say they perceived–are established without substantial controversy. Defendant merely clouds the inquiry into that question by formulating the operative facts in the intermediate form of a witness’s perceptions or statements.

We believe trial courts have the inherent power to strike proposed “undisputed facts” that fail to comply with the statutory requirements and that are formulated so as to impede rather than aid an orderly determination whether the case presents triable material issues of fact. If such an order leaves the required separate statement insufficient to support the motion, the court is justified in denying the motion on that basis. (See Sec. 437c, subd. (b)(1).)

Reeves v. Safeway, 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 105-106 (2004)

Anyone making or opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication should review the “material facts” set forth in the Separate Statement with the foregoing in mind.

Drafting an Effective Response to a Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.

If you are opposing a Motion for Summary Judgment or Motion for Summary Adjudication, three techniques are especially helpful in drafting an effective Response to the moving party’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.  First, object to the UMF if the UMF itself relies upon objectionable evidence.  Second, set forth abundant, admissible evidence that disputes and contradicts the UMF.  Third, rather than just summarizing your cited evidence, use exact quotations whenever possible.

Objecting to a UMF because the UMF is based is upon objectionable evidence is sound practice.  California Rule of Court 3.1354(b) prohibits from objecting to the evidence in a Response to Separate Statement: “All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion. Objections on specific evidence may be referenced by the objection number in the right column of a separate statement in opposition or reply to a motion, but the objections must not be restated or reargued in the separate statement.”  However, nothing prohibits a party from objecting to the “undisputed material fact” itself rather than the evidence.  This distinction is important.

CRC 3.1350(f) sets forth that the responding party is to set forth the “nature of the dispute” in the right-hand column of the Response to Separate Statement.  If the nature of the dispute is that the UMF is based upon unsound or objectionable evidence, it follows that such deficiencies should be set forth in the right-hand column.  Likewise, Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c(b)(3) provides that “the opposition papers shall include a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed . . .”  Given the confusing and contradictory nature of the aforementioned rules, it is prudent within the Response to Separate Statement to object to any UMF’s that are based upon objectionable evidence.

Here is a sample from a Response to Moving Party’s Separate Statement where the objections to the UMF are set forth near the top of the right-hand column:

	Moving Party’s “Undisputed Material Fact” & Supporting Evidence	Opposing Party’s Response to the Moving Party’s UMF.
1.	Manager X disciplined Plaintiff because Plaintiff showed poor business judgment when she violated company guidelines by letting the janitor leave work early.(Manager X’s Deposition, 259:23-261:7.)	Disputed.Objection to UMF: The UMF improperly relies upon evidence that violates the Secondary Evidence Rule, lacks foundation, and is hearsay.  (See Plaintiff’s Objections to Evidence, Nos. 2 and 4.)The evidence cited by the moving party does not support the UMF.Defendant has not cited to any written “company guidelines” that Plaintiff has supposedly violated. (Defs.’ Motion for Summary Judgment, in passim.) Plaintiff’s actions were in accordance with company policy that allowed a supervisor to let employees leave work early for medical appointments.  (Supervisor Declaration, para. 3-4, Plaintiff’s Depo, 120:2-20; Company Policy Handbook, page 6, lines 1-7.) Company policy allows a supervisor to let employees leave early for medical appointments: “A supervisor may let an employee leave work early for a medical appointment if a doctor’s note is presented at that time.” (Company Policy Handbook, page 6, lines 1-7.) Plaintiff was a supervisor at all relevant times. (Manager’s Deposition, 54:22-55:8; Plaintiff’s Deposition, 102:4-9.) The janitor had a medical appointment on the date and time at issue.  (Janitor’s Declaration, para. 1-3; Exhibit 1 to Janitor’s Declaration [“Doctor’s Note”].) The Janitor presented a doctor’s note reflecting that he had a medical appointment on the date and time at issue: “I gave Plaintiff supervisor my doctor’s note and told her that I had to leave for my heart examination.” (Janitor’s Declaration, pg. 1, para. 3-6; Exhibit 1 to Janitor’s Declaration [“Doctor’s Note”]) Normal custom and practice at company was to let employees leave early if they had a doctor’s note for an appointment. (Employee Y Declaration, pg. 3, para. 16; and Exhibit 5.) Plaintiff’s discipline was more severe than that received by male supervisors for the same purported violation. (Employee W’s Declaration., pg. 2, para. 7-9; Plaintiff’s Depo., 34:16-24.)

Rule of Court  3.1350(f) requires that “an opposing party who contends that a fact is disputed must state, on the right side of the page directly opposite the fact in dispute, the nature of the dispute and describe the evidence that supports the position that the fact is controverted. That evidence must be supported by citation to exhibit, title, page, and line numbers in the evidence submitted.”  The sample above reflects that the opposing party was not content to just cite to one or two pieces of evidence to contravene the moving party’s UMF.  Instead, multiple witnesses and evidentiary sources were cited.  It just makes it so much easier for the court to rule in your favor if multiple witnesses and multiple documents support your position.  Citing evidence such as admissions from the moving party or the moving party’s own witnesses is also especially helpful in this regard.

Lastly, it is important to provide actual quotations whenever possible.  Judges are routinely frustrated with attorneys who incorrectly summarize or spin evidence.  By providing concise quotations that directly address the pertinent issue, you bolster your side’s credibility and also make it much easier for the court to rule in your favor.  So, the above sample actually quotes the company handbook on the policy at issue, and also provides the exact testimony the janitor gave in his deposition.  This technique is much more effective than just summarizing that evidence and hoping the judge will actually cross-reference the multitude of citations presented.

Reply Separate Statements Are Improper in a Motion for Summary Judgment

As part of the Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Motion for Summary Adjudication filing, attorneys sometimes submit a document titled “Reply Separate Statement.”  In the Reply Separate Statement, the moving attorneys will raise objections to the evidence cited in the opposing party’s Separate Statement and also cite to additional evidence to refute the opposing party’s’s evidence. California Rule of Court 3.1113 limits a Reply Memorandum of Points & Authorities to ten pages, so the Reply Separate Statement is often used as an end-run around this page limitation.

The problem with filing a Reply Separate Statement is that no such pleading is allowed under the Code of Civil Procedure, California Rules of Court, or any other authority.  The Court of Appeal specifically castigated the San Francisco office of Littler Mendelson for filing a Reply Separate Statement in Nazir v. United Airlines, 178 Cal. App. 4th 243, 252 (2009).  In a scathing opinion, the Court of Appeal, after addressing numerous problems in the pleadings filed by Littler Mendelson, pointed out the following:  “The deficiencies carried over to the reply papers, which included a 297-page reply separate statement. There is no provision in the statute for this.”  Nazir, 252.  However, this reprimand has still not stopped Littler Mendelson or other attorneys from continuing to file this prohibited pleading.

Not known for overstatement, the Court of Appeal found this to be “a case involving what may well be the most oppressive motion ever presented to a superior court.”  Nazir, 248.  The opinion then set forth: “Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication, seeking adjudication of 44 issues, most of which were not proper subjects of adjudication.  Defendants’ separate statement was 196 pages long, setting forth hundreds of facts, many of them not material—as defendants’ own papers conceded.  And the moving papers concluded with a request for judicial notice of 174 pages.  All told, defendants’ moving papers were 1056 pages.”  Nazir, 249.

Twice in the opinion, the Court of Appeal emphasized that a “Reply Separate Statement” is not allowed:  “Defendants’ reply included, and properly, their response to plaintiff’s additional disputed facts.  Defendants’ reply also included, not so properly, a 297-page “Reply Separate Statement” and 153 pages of “Exhibits and Evidence in Support of Defendants’ Reply.”  And the reply culminated with 324 pages of evidentiary objections, consisting of 764 specific objections, 325 of which were directed to portions of plaintiff’s declaration, many of which objections were frivolous.  In all, defendants filed 1,150 pages of reply.” Nazir, 249.  In the Nazir opinion, the Court of Appeal also observed that the 153 pages of “Exhibits and Evidence in Support of Reply” was improper because “[n]o such [new] evidence is generally allowed.  Nazir, 252.

The Supreme Court has held that an attorney is not entitled to recover hours which are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).  Rule 4-200(A) of the California Rules of Professional Conduct mandates that “[a] member shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or unconscionable fee.”  It seems that a disgruntled client would have legitimate grounds to claim that it was charged an unconscionable fee if a law firm charged it for a pleading that has been specifically prohibited by the Court of Appeal.

So, as a litigant or attorney, what does one do when confronted with a “Reply Separate Statement”?  You usually are forewarned when defense counsel requests an electronic version of your client’s Response to the Moving Party’s Separate Statement.  California Rule of Court  3.1350(i)  provides that the a party must provide an electronic version of its Separate Statement within three days of the request.  However, I would argue that Rule 3.1350(i) does not mandate that a party opposing an MSJ/MSA provide an electronic version to the moving party because Rule 3.1350 doesn’t even mention or allow for, just as Nazir confirmed, a Reply Separate Statement.   So, simply refuse to provide an electronic version and cite to the Nazir case.  Also, point out that by filing a Reply Separate Statement they are intentionally evading the ten-page limit for a Memorandum of Points & Authorities.  For good measure, it doesn’t hurt to point out in your refusal letter that the attorneys are being unethical in overbilling their clients for “unnecessary” work on a prohibited pleading.

If the moving party still insists upon filing a Reply Separate Statement, file a written objection with the court citing these same authorities and objections.  Notwithstanding, out of an abundance of caution, you should still address and refute all of the points and evidence cited to in the Reply Separate Statement.  Until judges crack down on this behavior with meaningful consequences, it is still going to continue unchecked.

Jury Fees Are Now Due the Day of Initial Case Management Conference

All attorneys and litigants need to carefully review Code of Civil Procedure Section 631, which was amended effective June 27, 2012.  The most significant change is that Section 631 now requires, with some exceptions, a party to deposit the $150.00 in jury fees no later than on or before the date scheduled for the initial case management conference.  Two of the key subsections of Section 631 read as follows:

CCP Sec. 631(c): The advance jury fee deposit shall be made on or before the date scheduled for the initial case management conference in the action. If no case management conference is scheduled in a civil action, the advance jury deposit shall be made no later than 365 calendar days after the filing of the initial complaint. If the party has not appeared before the initial case management conference or has appeared more than 365 calendar days after the filing of the initial complaint, the deposit shall be made as provided in subdivision (d).

CCP Sec. 631(d) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c), the deposit of advance jury fees shall be made at least 25 calendar days before the date initially set for trial, except that in unlawful detainer actions the fees shall be deposited at least five days before the date set for trial.

Now, jury fees deposited on or after June 27, 2012 are non-refundable.  Moreover, the new rules apply even if the case was filed before June 27, 2012.

By failing to timely deposit jury fees, that party waives the right to a trial by jury in that action. CCP Sec. 631(f)(5).  Of course, the court may, in its discretion and upon just terms, allow a trial by jury despite the waiver. CCP Sec. 631(g).  But no one wants to write a motion seeking relief from a waiver of a jury trial.